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UETA & E-Sign-Contract Formation & Enforcement-
What Law Governs a "goods" Transaction?*
Lawrence Brown
BARRY CHATZ: If I can say one thing before we get started with
the next panelist, this is the perfect intersection of DePaul Univer-
sity's law school and commercial law league to bring about this type of
discussion which has the practical effect of talking about how lawyers
will be able to protect their clients, as well as the intellectual discus-
sion that we've just listened to.
Lawrence Brown is here to talk about UETA and E-Sign. I think
that's the perfect transition from what we just listened to for the last
hour or so.
Mr. Brown's practice involves state and federal trial and appellate
matters concerning commercial transactions, business torts, bank-
ruptcy, trade regulation and corporate governance. He's participated
in the drafting of a treatise of the law of the European Economic
Community. He's involved in the Uniform Laws Committee with the
Commercial Law League. We're pleased to have him here, and I look
forward to his comments.
Thank you.
LAWRENCE C. BROWN: My perspective as a speaker will be dif-
ferent than Professor White's because my background is in trial work.
One of the things that I noticed when I was preparing for this pres-
entation is that it seems that revised Article 2 was taking an entirely
different perspective on preservation of the Uniform Commercial
Code against outside intrusions by statute. If you were to take a look
at revised 2-108 and my materials, if they are available, I go into this
matter in some detail.
You're going to find that Article 2, in its deference provisions, in-
verts the policy of Article 1. And one of the important things we're
going to be talking about here today is how, in fact, Article 2 in its
revised form is becoming a default statute in that, if no other provi-
sions apply from non-Article 2 law, then Article 2 will control. It's a
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the second panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Out with the Old, In with the New? Articles 2 and
2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, held on April 7, 2005.
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very different concept for myself, as a trial lawyer and as a draftsman,
because I've always thought, except in the consumer realm under the
present 2-102 that Article 2 should be paramount, and it isn't.
Now, to try to save some time, I'm going to start by saying that
uniform electronic contracting statute - the UETA referred to this
morning (Uniform Electronic Transactions Act) was issued in its final
form in 1999. Forty states have adopted it, and if you have my materi-
als in front of you, I call.attention to footnote sixteen and caution you
that the states adopting UETA have not necessarily adopted the final
1999 draft as its drafters intended.
I come from New York. New York did not adopt UETA. There are
three other states that do not have any form of UETA, those being
Alaska, Georgia and Washington. States that have adopted the act in
a form variant from the final 1999 form are Arizona, California, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Nevada, New Mexico and Virginia.
Legislation that's almost the same as UETA 1999 final draft - and
you've got to read these statutes line-for-line as they're adopted -
was enacted in the District of Columbia, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota and Tennessee. The remaining states have adopted the
UETA 1999 final draft.
Now you ask why am I bringing this up? Let's take a look at the E-
Sign law. E-Sign is a pre-emptive federal statute for electronic con-
tracting. There were two ways a state can opt out of E-Sign. One is to
adopt the 1999 UETA final' draft. Whatever state you're in, you
should inquire whether your state has adopted that final 1999 draft.
A little later in this presentation, I'm going to discuss preemption
problems and some of the issues that have arisen in case law because
there has to be a line-by-line harmonization between the form of
UETA that's been adopted in a particular state and the E-Sign law.
You should be cautioned that E-Sign, although allowing a state to opt
out of substantial parts of E-Sign by adoption of the UETA final draft,
still prevails concerning certain consumer notice protection issues. If
you think that preemption is not going to occur because the UETA
has been adopted under E-Sign, this is only true as to the E-Sign pro-
visions which permit opt out.
Now what I'd like to do is interrelate what I'm presenting this
morning with the contract formation process under present Article 2
and revised Article 2 as it's been proposed.
As you probably know as commercial lawyers and students, 2-204
and 2-206 are the present U.C.C. contract formation provisions. 2-206
concerns more or less offer and acceptance and when it has been de-
termined that an offer has been made in a form that can be accepted.
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Revised Article 2 carries those rules over, modifying them slightly to
allow for electronic contracting, except for a provision that's been
moved over from 2-207. And I'm sorry Professor White's still not
here because -
JAMES J. WHITE: I am here.
LAWRENCE C. BROWN: Oh, you are here. I'm sorry.
You wrote in an article in the 2004 symposium on freedom of con-
tract in Wisconsin Law Review about this particular provision, and it's
been moved over from 2-207 to 2-206. It's the new revised 2-206(3),
which is a disguised version of the knockout rule. And by that, what is
meant is that an offer and acceptance do not have to be a mirror im-
age of each other, but if there arel central or critical terms that are
alike, the acceptance of the offer will have been deemed to occur as to
those terms.
Insofar as what is proposed with respect to 2-204 and 2-206 in the
electronic contracting area, they treat electronic transactions the same
as they do nonelectronic transactions, but there are complications in-
troduced as the result of certain other provisions addressing the elec-
tronic contracting process itself.
If one addresses UETA's coverage, compared with the focus of E-
Sign, UETA focuses on parties who consent or agree to do business
electronically. That's a different concept than that of E-Sign. E-Sign
deals with interstate commerce and transactions affecting it. And that
literally means that almost any consumer transaction that could be
considered to have an impact in interstate commerce is going to be
affected by E-Sign, regardless of consent. That's not true of UETA.
Unless you have consent by a party to deal with another party through
an electronic media, UETA's scope indicates that UETA will not ap-
ply, and you will either have to resort to E-Sign or some other rules to
determine whether or not the parties have made an enforceable
contract.
I could not find any case law which addressed the issue of absence
of consent to electronically contract, but that gap will probably have
to be addressed by the courts if not legislatively dealt with.
UETA and E-Sign both have provisions to facilitate electronic con-
tracting. They have similarities, but there are significant differences.
If you have my materials, I'm on page nine at B1. UETA was
adopted before E-Sign. E-Sign adopts UETA's legal recognition of
electronic records, signatures and contracts; the materials set forth
cites after each of these points. Neither statute requires a person to
use electronic media to enter into an agreement. Both statutes' re-
20051
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cord retention rules are satisfied through electronic means, which ac-
curately store and reflect information in the records.
E-Sign utilizes UETA definitions of electronic record, information,
person, record and uses different language.with similar meaning for
the definitions of electronic agent, electronic system and transaction.
It's important you know each of these definitions because you've got
to determine whether or not the rules in each of these statutes have
been complied with in the context of the definitions. They each per-
mit electronic originals and have retention and accessibility rules for
records acquired for later reference, notarization rules and rules ad-
dressed to an electronic agent's acts, such as in the case of a click-
through process' operation for attribution of intent to contract by a
party entering into a transaction. These statutes do not apply to
U.C.C. Articles 3 through.9, nor to Article 1, except for Sections 1-107
and 1-206.
It's necessary to recognize the dissimilarities in UETA and E-Sign
because there are going to be default situations as a result of the gaps
between the statutes' coverages. E-Sign requires the obtaining of con-
sumer consent to use of electronic means to deliver any required in-
formation in a transaction. It prescribes the procedure for obtaining
that consent to the use of electronic means to deliver that information.
It disqualifies oral communications or recordings from being elec-
tronic records for the purpose of consumer notices and disclosure, and
it prohibits the exercise of regulatory authority to circumvent E-Sign's
provisions. It contains exceptions to coverage beyond those of
UETA, as well as certain exceptions to coverage provided for by
UETA.
E-Sign does not contain default rules specifying when an electronic
record was sent or received. UETA does. It also does not contain
default rules on the effect of errors and changes in transmissions and
the admission of electronic records into evidence. E-Sign does pro-
vide specific preservation of the protection of other consumer laws
concerning the content or timing of any disclosure or record to be
provided to a consumer, as well as the protection of other laws other
than a requirement that documents or contracts be written, signed or
in non-electronic form.
One of the major differences between E-Sign and UETA is that
UETA deals with issues of evidence, as well as the processes for elec-
tronic contracting. You can find yourself in a situation under UETA
where, in fact, if certain events do not occur, a contract is going to be
unenforceable. That's why I disagree with comments in the statutory
comments under UETA that it's not intended to affect the substantive
[Vol. 3:539
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law of contract. I don't think that's true. It becomes problematical
when you have a transaction that is not enforceable because you can't
prove it up pursuant to the provisions of UETA.
Also in terms of E-Sign and UETA, we have to look at preemption
considerations. E-Sign applies to all business and consumer transac-
tions in interstate commerce, and the nexus with commerce can be at
just about any level. I've cited Wickard v. Filburn,1 which is probably
the broadest penetration of the interstate commerce power, and you
can easily argue that any transaction with a vendor, and particularly in
electronic commerce that's across state lines and uses wire or mail, is
going to be covered by the E-Sign statute.
The UETA final draft of 1999, as I mentioned before, is one of the
safe harbor opt outs from E-Sign. The only cautionary notes are that
the opt-out provision refers to the 1999 UETA final draft, and that
there are provisions of E-Sign that cannot be avoided. Those are the
consumer disclosure provisions in subchapters one and two.2 If you
do have a UETA statute in your state, you have to analyze it for com-
pliance with E-Sign subchapters one and two concerning consumer
disclosures. Despite the existence of the opt-out provision, one must
comply with both laws.
There is a second way to opt out of E-Sign; the adoption of a non-
UETA compliant statute. This is what has been attempted in revised
Article 2. The method used is to state that the statute does not over-
ride or attempt to override E-Sign subchapters one and two, the con-
sumer protective provisions. The statute may not favor a specific
technology or technical specification concerning functions involved in
use of electronic records or signatures, and if enacted after E-Sign,
which was adopted June 30, 2000, must make specific reference to the
E-Sign Act.
As I indicated, revised Article 2 uses this non-UETA approach.
The preemption provisions require a practitioner to determine, in the
context of a matter within E-Sign's scope, the extent to which and
whether a state laws pre-empts it. The statutory language in E-Sign
sections one and two suggests there are four' categories of statutes that
one can confront.3
First, where the 1999 UETA final draft has been adopted, this ef-
fects an opt out from the pre-emption requirements, save that the con-
sumer disclosure rules of E-Sign apply.
1. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2005).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2005).
2005],
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The second category is where state has adopted the UETA 1999
final draft but with changes or amendments.
The third is where the state adopts laws or regulations that meet the
requirements of E-Sign's non-UETAopt, out.
The fourth is where the state adopts laws or regulations concerning
electronic systems or records that have legal effects similar to E-Sign
and UETA, as through enforcement of electronic records and agree-
ments, but otherwise deviate from both statutes. An example is New
York's law where New York doesn't adopt UETA or attempt to opt
out of E-Sign but, instead, tries to harmonize its statutes and cases
arising thereunder with the federal E-Sign provisions. 4
And as I think I have indicated in the materials, adoption of law
consistent with E-Sign will allow a state to opt out, but whenever you
have a situation where a state has altered the UETA 1999 final draft,
you're going to have to check for the consistency of that amendment
with the E-Sign provisions.
The preemption question is significant for these reasons. You have
to evaluate whether UETA or alternative state law or regulations
limit, modify or supersede the requirements of E-Sign, except for the
consumer protective provisions because, while E-Sign violations in
and of themselves do not necessarily mean a contract can't be en-
forced, they are one of the considerations a court will undertake in
evaluating whether you do have an enforceable agreement consistent
with applicable state laws.
As no state has adopted revised Article 2, you have to refer to
UETA, where adopted. I think Professor White mentioned this. You
have to refer to UETA if the state has it, and harmonize it with pre-
sent Article 2. In fact, that's what New Jersey's statutory commission
has recommended. I've placed a notation to a state report in this pa-
per that indicates how New Jersey has attempted to do that. In New
Jersey, they've advised against adopting revised Article 2 as redun-
dant if the reason that revised Article 2 is, being adopted is to facilitate
electronic contracting in that state.
I'd like to turn next, if I could, to the scope of revised Article 2,
choice of law issues in both electronic and non-electronic contracting.
The scope of revised Article 2 concerning transactions focuses on
the definition of goods. We're all familiar with the goods and services
issues that have been addressed in litigation under the present Article
4. See On Line Power Technologies, Inc. v. Square D Co., 2004 WL 1171405, *9 (unre-
ported)(S.D.N.Y.2004); New York v. McFarlan, 19i Misc.2d.531, 537-540, 744 N.Y.S. 2d 287,
293-294 (Sup.Ct. N.Y. Co. 2002).
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2. However, the drafters in revised Article 2 specifically define goods
as not including information.5 That was an intentional omission which
evolved with the discussions for adoption of UCITA, The Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act, as described in the drafters'
comments. The exclusion creates problems because it will require
case by case analysis of the composition of an item being sold. "Infor-
mation" is separately defined in revised 2-103(1)(m) as including com-
puter programs, software and computer information. 6
In defining goods as excluding information, the drafters also opted
out of endorsing or rejecting particular approaches for determining
applicability of revised Article 2. There is a lesson in those comments,
and that lesson is that you may, in opting out of Article 2 for part or
all of a transaction, lose the benefits of Article 2 in terms of its liberal
contract formation, interpretation and enforcement provisions.
The drafters, in describing analysis of a transaction, gave examples
of Article 2 application focusing on transactions that had mixed char-
acteristics. The first one involves goods predominant in the transac-
tion. The second involves goods being the source of the dispute,
although not predominant in the transaction, and the third being
goods integrated with information.
Non-application of Article 2 involves nongoods being predominant,
nongoods being the source of the dispute, though goods were predom-
inant, and an integrated product containing goods.
The final category involved the division of a transaction into its ele-
ments with Article 2 only applying to the goods. I've cited a case from
the Western District of Tennessee that has addressed the problem of
analyzing goods and non-goods in a transaction and what the implica-
tions are for non-applicability of Article 2 in the event one decides to
opt out of all or part of the transaction from Article 2.
Points (2) and (4) in the proposed comments to Revised Article 2-
102, when read with the definition of goods, should be a cause for
concern for draftsmen as well as litigators.
Whether and to what extent Article 2 applies is going to determine,
in material part, the tactical approach to a case because you're going
to have a choice, when you're dealing with Article 2 and non-Article 2
law, which best benefits your client. The same point applies to the
drafting of agreements. You have a situation where you not only have
a choice of what state's law is going to apply,you're presented with an
opportunity as to whether you're going to opt out of Article 2 or not
5. U.C.C. § 2-105 (2005).
6. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(m) (2005).
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by defining the content of your transaction. It's also important to re-
alize the difference between applicability of Article 2 and other rules
in terms of dealing with the subject matter. There are evidence impli-
cations, including the parol evidence rule, as the common law parol
evidence rule is stricter. You have different issues concerning statutes
of limitation and the remedies that are available.
Revised 2-108,7 provides us another opportunity to deal with the
issue of whether Article 2 applies or not; revised 2-108 is a new pro-
posed statute. Initially, the present Article 2 provides deference to
consumer statutes, but does not refer to case law or regulations in the
context of deference.
Revised 2-108,8 presents an entirely new statutory matrix when
you're concerned with how to opt out of Article 2 because the transac-
tion definition provides us with an entirely different set of analytical
rules than those used under the present statute.
Revised 2-108 has its genesis in the present U.C.C. Section 2A-
104(1).9 It provides in part that a transaction subject to revised Arti-
cle 2 is also subject to any rule of law that establishes a different rule
for consumers. 10
Revised 2-108 further provides that, for the purposes of Article 2,
failure to comply with the non-Article 2 law has only the effects speci-
fied in that law.11 There are two points to recognize on this opt out
provision for different rules for consumers. The definition of the term
"rule of law" is expansive. It includes not only statutes as in the pre-
sent law, but it also extends to administrative rules properly promul-
gated under the applicable statute and "final" court decisions.
Trial lawyers particularly will appreciate a case cited from the Texas
Supreme Court that concerns injury to a consumer from supply of
electrical power. The trial court, after extensive hearings, made a de-
termination that the U.C.C. didn't apply in terms of unconscionability
and barred damages in a personal injury action.
The intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court; it deter-
mined the U.C.C. applied and directed the case should go forward,
with the consumer able to take advantage of the unconscionability
ban on limitation of damages in Article 2 of the U.C.C.
7. U.C.C. § 2-208 (2005).
8. Id.
9. U.C.C. § 2A -104(1) (2005).
10. U.C.C. § 2-108 (2005).
11. Id.
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The Texas Supreme Court reversed and stated the U.C.C. didn't ap-
ply to the transaction, and even if it did, found there had to be defer-
ence to the utility scheme for regulation in the State of Texas.
One can only wonder what would have happened if the consumer
that had lost in the intermediate appellate court and didn't have the
money to appeal. A "final court" decision is one that's no longer sus-
ceptible to appeal. I can't imagine, in terms of the Revised Article 2
definition of a "rule of law", the impact upon certainty in a statute
where one has to consider as "final" all decisions that aren't appealed
which are contrary to or in favor of your client's position. One would
literally have to research every case, hopefully all that are reported, to
determine what the "rule of law" was in a particular jurisdiction in
situations where the consumer rules are different and/or law other
then Article 2 applied in part or in whole.
Also problematical in revised Article 2 is that it also defers to any
other law that governs in the event of a conflict with revised Article 2
in application to a transaction, as provided in revised 2-108(2). 12
Although the present Article 2 specifically defers to consumer pro-
tection statutes, the proposed subordination to decisions presumably
implicates common law. I'm suggesting this extends beyond judicial
decisions concerning statutes, and includes common law. This goes far
beyond the Article 2 deference to consumer statutes.
Please also note that in the proposed comment to 2-108 in para-
graph four, the drafters admit that federal and state consumer laws
vary from transaction to transaction and from state to state,13 sug-
gesting we not only have to determine what state the transaction is in
and what the "rule of law" is, but that the analysis is going to be on a
transaction-by-transaction basis.
To the extent of their application, non-revised Article 2 laws would
control. In the event there's a conflict in the consumer context in any
portion of a transaction, you're opted out of Article 2, possibly for
contract formation, possibly for remedies, such as the type of reme-
dies that Professor White was addressing before. One may not have
those liberal remedies that the U.C.C. provides. You may be limited
by state law. The revised Article 2 statutory change does not promise
that a more liberal statute is going to apply. One may be opted out
into a much stricter regimen, and I don't see that that's been recog-
nized in terms of the liberalization for protection of consumers.
12. U.C.C. § 2-108(2) (2005).
13. U.C.C. § 2-108 Comment 4 (2005).
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In the consumer transaction context, there is a different issue raised
by the inclusion of judicial decisions, and that is where you have a
diminishing prospect for obtaining uniformity in consumer commerce.
This is detrimental. You have a situation where the choice of law pro-
visions are as referred to by Professor White, in revised Article 1.
One not only has a deferral to consumer statutes, but also choice of
law problems as to the choice of. law in the state were the consumer
resides, requiring one to analyze transactions with reference to defer-
ral and choice of law considerations.
There is another provision concerning deference under revised Ar-
ticle 2, and that's revised 2-108(1)(c), 14 and I'm on page 17 of the
materials. Revised 2-108(1)(c) involves the commercial realm as well
as consumer matters. Revised 2-108(1)(c) provides a preemptive ef-
fect for all state statutes covering a transaction also subject to revised
Article 2. The result of the statute is the creation of parallel statutory
schemes.
The scope of a statute's preemptive effect is said to vary with the
particular statute in question in its comparison to revised Article 2.
The drafters caution, in their comments, the scope and effect of stat-
utes must be assessed on a state-by-state basis. 15 The proposed com-
ment doesn't explain why 2-108(1)(c) is limited to statutes, as
distinguished from the broader rule of law term used with respect to
consumer transactions. If one believes that statutes are to be imple-
mented through judicial decision, as well as an administrative regula-
tion, one has to ask why the drafters chose a narrower route under 2-
108(c). They really don't explain their choice.
In terms of remedies, there's also deference in the revised Article 2
concerning remedies. Revised 2-108(3) provides failure to comply
with a non-revised Article 2 statute has only the effect prescribed in
that statute.16 If you have a controlling statute that's not in Article 2
and that law is breached, you only have the remedy or the conse-
quence provided for in that law. You're totally out of Article 2 for
those purposes. Therefore, if you have more liberal remedies provided
by Article 2, you have to ask whether you want that non-Article 2 law
to apply and, if so, how to go about getting Article 2 to apply, depend-
ing on the advantages of each statute.
Revised, 2-108(3) presumably limits the effect of statutory breach to
remedies and defenses set forth in that statute.17 Adding to the lack of
14. U.C.C. § 2-108 (1)(c) (2005)..
15. See U.C.C. § 2-108 Comment 4 (2005).
16. U.C.C. § 2-108(3) (2005):
17. Id.
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clarity is the phrase at the beginning of the comment concerning 2-
108(3), "Assuming a conflict." All these rules apply only if there's a
conflict, so determining a conflict's existence is where one starts. The
question that I would put to you would be, if you had a choice in
drafting - and we've heard Professor White speak about drafting -
how would you write around this type of statute? You would literally
not only have to write with attention to revised Article 2, you would
have to take into account all statutes with which revised Article 2 con-
flicted in any state in which you wanted to do business, and analyze
the conflicts with reference to the various parts of a transaction.
Note that in terms of the examples and the effects specified in the
proposed comment to 2-108(3), one is unenforceability for failure to
obtain a license under a state licensing statute and the second is a
limitation in statute for liability for sales of non-merchantable blood
under a blood shield law.18 The lesson from that is, of course, that you
can have a limitation of remedies or your contract may be entirely
precluded from enforcement, so the dissection of transactions into
their parts by the statute is something that practitioners have to be
aware of.
In terms of analyzing the statute for non-revised Article 2 applica-
ble law for consumer situations, a practitioner has to analyze all rules
of law from non-revised Article 2 sources applicable to agreement for-
mation, performance, enforcement of contract rights and obligations.
In the commercial field, this would be limited to statutes only. This
analysis would also be affected by any enforceable choice of law pro-
visions in the party's contract, assuming that the choice for law itself
was not mandated by statutes applicable to the subject matter of the
contract or based on other applicable criteria.
You recall Professor White referred to the choice of law change that
was proposed in revised Article 1, and is not being adopted in most
states. I suggest the reason that it's not being adopted is it will create
mayhem in terms of the consumer transactional activity both in e-
commerce and in non-e-commerce transactions.
I think that practitioners have to evaluate of the effect of these stat-
utes on the right of parties to contract. What's happening in terms of
revised Article 2-108 is that there are a number of opt outs from re-
vised Article 2 that create drafting problems, particularly in the field
of consumer transactions. In states such as New York where you have
non-UCC statutes that apply. to particular types of transactions, we
have to ask ourselves, "what's the impact on vendors in electronic
18. U.C.C. § 2-108 Comment 4 (2005).
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commerce and their customers who are not knowledgeable about the
effect of applicable law on their agreements? Are parties passively
agreeing to terms that they don't intend to apply to their agree-
ments?" The question applies both in commercial and noncommer-
cial situations.
What do we do when we don't know what the substance of the
transaction is until the rule of law is determined? And by that I mean
if you have to bring a case to enforce a contract and you're represent-
ing a consumer, you won't know what the applicable law is until you
look at all the "final" decisions in a jurisdiction. He who has the "fi-
nal" court decision, wins in that case. That's very unsettling for a trial
lawyer and the draftsmen, particularly when the highest courts of the
jurisdiction have not ruled on the specific matter being addressed.
One also has to ask if parties are going to find themselves under obli-
gations they never affirmatively intended to assume or subject them-
selves to in a particular context.
Next, I'd like to talk about revised Article 2's relationship to E-
Sign and UETA. Revised Article 2 employs a non-UETA opting out
of E-Sign. States adopting UETA to avoid E-Sign preemption can do
so provided there are no exceptions 'to UETA's scope that would vio-
late E-Sign. However, we've got to remember that with Rule 2-108(4)
it applies only to transactions under revised Article 2.19 This suggests
that opting out of revised Article 2 requires, in the e-commerce situa-
tion, reference to other means for complying with E-Sign.
You remember Professor White speaking earlier about the E-Sign
provisions in revised Article 1. Well, here we have revised Article 2
with its own specific transactional opting out of the E-Sign pre-emp-
tion. This creates two issues. It begs the problem of what law applies
where there is deference to non-revised Article 2 law. As I indicated
earlier, you have an issue that when revised Article 2 does not apply
you will have to make a reference to a default law, the initial query
being whether your state has a version of UETA or a non-UETA
scheme that properly opts out of E-Sign. Otherwise, you have to eval-
uate the applicability of E-Sign, of UETA and of the state law to de-
termine the applicable rules for an electronic contract.
There are problems with revised Article 2 other than those involv-
ing deference and opt outs. It uses certain definitions from UETA for
electronic, electronic agent, electronic record and record. Other
terms such as automated transaction and electronic signature are not
included.
19. U.C.C. § 2-108(4) (2005).
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Revised 2-103(l)(p) defines sign - and you heard Professor White
refer to the difference in the definitions between Article 1 and Article
2 before - as taking certain types of actions with present intent to
authenticate or adopt a record,20 a definition not having a parallel in
either UETA or E-Sign, but describing an act resulting in attribution
under UETA's section nine closely resembling that of electronic sig-
nature as defined in E-Sign. It also omits certain UETA defined
terms. One has to ask in this context whether revised Article 2-108(4)
actually is an effective opt out from E-Sign. I'm not sure it is. I ha-
ven't seen any commentary on it. I know there were complaints from
certain industrial organizations that they thought there hadn't been an
effective opt out of E-Sign, but since no state has adopted. the law,
there has been no evaluation in a litigated context what the result
would be.
I agree, as Professor White has also indicated, that those states that
have adopted UETA already have an effective means for accommo-
dating electronic transactions. As I indicated before, New Jersey in-
tends to harmonize the present Article 2 with UETA, and it's been
indicated in the New Jersey commission report, which I cite to in my
materials, that they don't think they're going to adopt revised Article
2 because of all the problems with it.
I'd like to move on to revised Article 2 and the proposed changes in
the parol evidence rule, Revised 2-202 and the tie-in to revised 2-
207.21 The parol evidence rule is one of those two basic rules of com-
mon law which was developed to preserve the substance of writings
the parties executed, thereby protecting written records against modi-
fication through concurrent or previously existing oral activity, the use
of which was sought to modify the writing. The traditional non-
U.C.C. parol evidence rule requires two elements to be present to ap-
ply the rule.
First, the final written agreement has got to be an integrated agree-
ment by which it is meant that the agreement represents the entire
understanding between the parties to the transaction. This is often
said to be satisfied when the contract appears complete on its face.
The second element is that the written contract's language must be
clear and unambiguous. U.C.C. 2-202, the present parol evidence rule
under Article 2,22 modifies the traditional parol evidence rule. In ad-
dressing the traditional two-part test, the Article 2 revision drafters
rejected assumptions that the final writing on some matters is under-
20. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(p) (2005).
21. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2005); U.C.C. § 2-207 (2005).
22. U.C.C. §2-202 (2005).
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stood as the final agreement on all matters. The agreement's language
would be interpreted with reference to the rules of construction of
existing law rather than using a contextual analysis, with a determina-
tion of ambiguity in agreement language required to admit evidence
of course of dealing, usage of trade or course of performance. The
modifications of the common law parol evidence rule were not stated
in the statute in the U.C.C. but were relegated to the official comment
explaining why the statutory language rejects certain requirements
and assumptions of the common law. The rejection is tacit. The draft-
ers of revised Article 2 acknowledge that the exception to common
law rule will not extend beyond its express terms, such that unless
specifically addressed by statute, the common law rule applies.
U.C.C. 2-202(a), our present statute, authorizes admitting the use of
course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance to explain
or supplement agreements unless carefully negated through drafting.
The allowing of such acts by the parties to explore or supplement an
agreement is because such acts represent elements of contracting that
parties have taken for granted.
However, the proposed revised Section 2-202 goes further and it
includes a detailed expression of principles for the application of re-
vised Article 2's parol evidence rule.23 Those principles are carefully
drawn to preserve and incorporate the course of performance, course
of dealing or usage of trade into agreements. The drafters state in
these rules - and it's important they be understood because they are
modifications to the common law, that if you're going to desire to
stay within Article 2 so you can prove your case, even if the written
record is complete and exclusive, it can be supplemented by applica-
ble course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade unless
those sources are carefully negated by a term in the written record. If
the record is final, complete and exclusive, it can not be supplemented
by evidence drawn from other sources, even if they are consistent with
the record. It's important to understand what that means. What the
drafters are telling you is that if, in fact, you have a tightly drawn
contract with merger and integration clauses, you will not be able to
introduce evidence concerning the interpretation or construction of
that agreement except with those three types of evidence that the
Code preserves. It's important that you understand that because the
contract is then only going to be what is in the writing.
The strength of the statutory assumption in the parol evidence rule
is such that unless specifically negated, course of performance, course
23. Id.
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of dealing and usage of trade become elements of the contract, not
means of its explanation or supplementation. One has to understand
the difference between integrations and total integrations. Whereas a
total integration excludes evidence of consistent terms, you have to
proceed under this new proposed statute beyond a total integration
clause and specifically bar use of course of dealing, usage of trade and
course of performance if you do not want them considered in interpre-
tation of the contract. This requires a sentence that clearly states the
bar in your agreements; this is a novel concept.
Revised 2-202's applications are distinguished from more stringent
common law rules in that parol evidence use will depend on whether
and to what extent revised Article 2 would apply to a transaction.
My review of the authorities causes me to believe that creation of
written material for use in electronic commerce should be no different
from that applicable to nonelectronic commerce provided that atten-
tion is paid to UETA and other applicable statutes for the require-
ments concerning enforceable transactions.
Statutes such as UETA may prevent enforcement of agreements
that would otherwise satisfy the parol evidence rules of the present
Article 2 and revised Article 2. UETA has a provision that requires
two steps to be taken for an enforceable transaction. First, a vendor
must not do anything to inhibit the party with whom it does business
from receiving and retaining a record that can be reproduced accu-
rately for any purposes including reference thereafter. If for some
reason, you are the sender of a communication to a party with whom
you are transacting business and somehow prevent that party from
preserving that record, there may be a problem proving that transac-
tion in a court of law because UETA makes that record unenforce-
able. So for those of you that are in UETA states, you have to
consider that provision. There are evidentiary problems and there are
substantive contract law rule problems proving up an electronic trans-
action in that context. It should be noted that while UETA's record
preservation protections are express in consumer transactions, the law
is so broad that it may be argued applicable to commercial
transactions.
A related question that you should ask is: who's responsible for
ensuring that the recipient has a system that can preserve the records?
That's left to the courts. The drafters of UETA dodged that bullet.
They indicated that the sender should be prepared, however, to prove
that it transmitted through electronic media specific information and
that a record was made that was susceptible to retention by a party
receiving it in the ordinary course of business.
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Another subject I'd like to address is the incorporation of a knock-
out rule through the parol evidence rule in revised Section 2-202.
That's a new provision that appears, unfortunately, only in the draft-
ers comments. I wish the drafters would put changes in the statute's
text. There's a general rule in common law jurisdictions that acts
which are in derogation of common law are supposed to be strictly
construed. Now, if you're dealing with that situation, why would you
place policy in legislative comments as the drafters in revised Section
2-202 did with the banishing of the rule of nonambiguity to permit the
introduction of evidence? If the drafters wanted to place the knock-
out rule in the parol evidence provisions of the new statute, they
should have just done so.
Instead, the drafters took the knockout rule from 2-20724 and, in
their comments to revised Section 2-202 stated that for parol evidence
purposes a contract created under the knockout rule would satisfy the
parol evidence rule. The knockout rule says that if you and I ex-
change terms, the policy of the U.C.C. favoring the finding of an
agreement will presume that to the extent our material exchanged
terms conform, a contract will be deemed to exist to the extent of the
conforming terms, plus gap fillers as necessary.25 Parties may be left
with a deal that they didn't intend to make on the terms that were
found. An interesting concept is introduced when a knockout rule
analysis forms an agreement that will be treated as an integration for
parol evidence rule purposes. We can only ask the question of how
one uses the parol evidence rule's principals to modify an agreement
crafted by a court out of the parties' conforming terms.
An integration states the parties agree on mutually acceptable
terms and that forms the basis of their contract. For parol evidence
rule purposes, we've taken the knockout rule out of 2-207. We've cre-
ated a contract out of those terms which the parties have in common
and now we're saying, for parol evidence purposes, that created con-
tract will be the operative agreement going forward, and the parol
evidence rule governs proof of additional consistent terms.
I don't know how many of you practice trial law, but I wouldn't
want to have to explain to a judge that I had the court create a con-
tract under 2-207, under consistent terms that the parties exchanged,
but not all the terms, and then that we were going to use this agree-
ment, apply the parol evidence rule going forward, to attempt to
prove up additional terms that each side thought were in the agree-
24. U.C.C. §2-207(3) (2005).
25. Id.
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ment. I assume the trial courts would have problems with that situa-
tion, but until somebody adopts the proposed version of the parol
evidence rule, we won't know what will happen.
Reconciliation of the proposed knockout rule and parol evidence
rules is important in the area of electronic commerce. You have what
have been called the rolling contract problems, on which the drafters
didn't take a stand in revised 2-207. The rolling contract situations
present in a situation that Professor White was alluding to were
where you have terms that are presented in response to which I click,
"I agree" in an electronic transaction. Let's say you order a computer
from Dell and read all the transaction terms presented on the screen.
You don't want to be bound to something that you didn't want to
agree to. You find yourself in a situation where the goods come and
the terms are materially different than the general terms that you read
on the screen.
Now, when is the contract formed? Is the contract formed when
you click-through, or is the contract formed when you receive the
goods and do not return them? There's a Seventh Circuit case,
ProCD v. Zeidenberg,26 which attempts to deal with that issue and
also attempts to deal with the issue of what would have happened if
the court dealt with it as a split goods transaction and tried to apply
non-Article 2 law.
The issue with a rolling contract is if you get a computer in a box
and it has terms different than the terms you clicked on when you said
"I agree," is when the contract is made and what are the terms?
The knockout rule, in terms of its application really wouldn't apply.
The question is what are the terms of the agreement in the first place?
Do you have an agreement when you keep the goods?
In one case the Seventh Circuit said once you held onto the goods
for thirty days, you accepted all the terms, including those that came
with the box. There's a competing series of cases that say no, that,
there has to be a manifestation of intent, and if that occurs at the front
end when you click, "I agree," that's the contract.
Now I leave it to you to consider what happens in electronic con-
tracting when you have rolling contract issues and the drafters say,
"we'll leave it to the courts." Well, here, I've got a revised statute that
says I'm out of Article 2 because I've got different consumer rules.
I'm out of Article 2 if I have parallel statutes. I don't understand what
the drafters are trying to do. What are they trying to accomplish?
26. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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If we want contract formation rules that are liberalized and rules
under revised Article 2 to apply, then we ought to say so when these
items come before your state legislatures. We ought to talk about
them in our bar associations because sooner or later we're all going to
find ourselves either drafting agreements or enforcing them in courts
in situations we never contemplated because we have situations
where, by statute, the drafters have said Article 2 doesn't apply. We
have to understand that what has happened here is that revised Arti-
cle 2 is slowly becoming a default statute, particularly in the consumer
realm, and that's going to cause a lot of difficulty in electronic com-
merce because you never know what the contract is and what law is
going to apply to it until a dispute occurs. In the goods, non-goods
situation, as well as the opt-out statutory provisions, the commercial
world is affected as well.
In terms of the knockout rule - and I want to continue with this
comparison of revised Rule 2-202 and 2-207 - a mutual intention in-
tegrated is presumed for terms with respect to which the confirmatory
records of the parties agree. I'm on page 27, of the materials for those
of you who are following. I have little idea why the drafters placed
the knockout rule provision in the proposed comment to revised 2-
202. It is an adoption of the substantive rule in revised 2-207(b) with
2-207 to be applied solely to define the terms of the contract subject to
2-202. Preferably, the drafters should have stated in the text of re-
vised Section 2-202 that mutual integration of terms is presumed for
terms as to which the parties' confirming records agree. This would
provide a clear statement of the effect of revised Section 2-202 upon
agreements created through knockout rule application, corresponding
to the revised section 2-207(b) provision expressing the relationships
between the two statutes.
2-207 itself provides that the terms of the contract are supplied by
three categories of terms in the conjunctive, those being terms which
appear in both parties' records (confirmatory memoranda), written or
oral terms to which the parties agree and gap fillers provided by the
U.C.C. or Article 2.27
The application of revised 2-207 subject to revised 2-202 creates va-
rious issues, even with the comfort of presumption of mutual intent to
integrate for parol evidence rule purposes. The knockout rule's appli-
cation extends only to the striking of conflicting terms and substituting
a gap filler as necessary, but does not otherwise apply concerning
27. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2005).
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other means of establishing the existence of additional terms or the
acceptance of terms by performance.
The impact of revised Section 2-202 upon revised Section 2-207
needs to be respected in an approach to a dispute. If you're going to
rely on the knockout rule in a case, you have to remember that only
statutory gap fillers may be used with the mutually agreed terms to
determine the agreement contract. You cannot establish additional
terms by performance unless referable to a preexisting agreement.
The drafters warn you about the limitations inherent in revised Sec-
tion 2-207, but they don't warn you about the consequences of it. The
consequences of it are that the parties may be left with a contract they
didn't make.
The application of knockout rule under revised Section 2-202 is only
one of the issues concerning the statutes' interaction. The questions
presented by parties' oral response to writings, writings in response to
oral communications and performance or other action in response to
oral or written communications considered in determining the content
of the agreement and what the parol evidence rule permits proved in
the first instance are left for disposition on a case-by-case basis. Pro-
fessor White's article in the 2004 Wisconsin Law Review Symposium,
Freedom from Contract,28 addresses the problems courts are going to
have resolving such issues because revised Section 2-202 and 2-207 do
not mesh well.
Finally, I'd like to address the change to the parol evidence rule
concerning statutory provisions regarding ambiguity. The revision of
Section 2-207 has Section 202 creating greater potential for litigation,
particularly with the adoption of the proposed knockout rule that re-
flects a policy favoring creation of contracts. The parties are going to
be forced, under revised 2-202,29 to recognize knockout terms as po-
tentially precluding additional terms because of the operation of Sec-
tion 2-207. And bythat I'm simply saying that because the operation
of the knockout rule is limited to gap fillers that are provided by stat-
ute and mutual terms, one is going to be precluded from taking advan-
tage of the liberalized parol evidence rule.
Thank you for your attention. If there are any questions, I will try
to answer them now.
28. James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, WIS. L. REV Freedom From Con-
tract Symposium, 723-46 (2004).
29. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2005).
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